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ProCD v. Zeidenberg and Cognitive Overload in Contractual Bargaining
Eric A. Posner1
October 28, 2009
Abstract. Judge Frank Easterbrook’s opinion in ProCD v. Zeidenberg has been
heavily criticized for ignoring the law and making unrealistic assumptions about
the ability of consumers to read and understand contract terms. This contribution
to a symposium on Judge Easterbrook’s judicial output argues that the opinion is
a classic example of the manipulation of legal doctrine to advance a policy goal—
here, enabling sellers to communicate contract terms when buyers’ time and
attention are limited. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Judge Easterbrook
implicitly assumes that buyers are fallible, not hyperrational; his doctrinal
solution persuasively addresses the problem of cognitive overload while
endorsing a valuable business tool—the “terms later” or “rolling” contract—that
reduces the cost of transacting.

Sellers often find it useful to sell products without revealing the terms of the contract to
buyers until after buyers have taken the products home or begun to use them. These transactions
take a number of forms. A buyer might purchase a box containing software or a database from a
store. The box’s skin bears the name of the software and a description of its function, and
perhaps a statement that other terms are inside or perhaps not. The buyer learns the terms only
after he takes the box home and opens it; if he does not like the terms, he can return the product
as long as he has not yet begun to use it, and sometimes not even then. A buyer might order a
computer or appliance or airplane ticket over the phone. The operator tells him none of the terms
other than price and a few others; again, he learns those terms when the product or ticket arrives
and may (or may not) have an opportunity at that point to repudiate the transaction.
The evident business reason for these “terms later” or “rolling” contracts, as they are
sometimes called, is that sellers cannot communicate all the relevant information to the buyer on
the outsides of boxes or in telephone conversations. Buyers do not have the time or patience to
listen to or read and understand the terms. The optimal terms cannot be disclosed without
causing cognitive overload. To avoid driving off buyers, sellers provide minimal information in
advance of purchase. Yet when buyers learn of unfavorable arbitration clauses or limited
warranties, they complain that they never consented to those terms, and therefore should not be
bound to them.2
1

Kirkland & Ellis Professor, University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Omri Ben-Shahar, Dick Craswell, and
Ariel Porat for helpful comments.
2
For the academic literature on these contracts, see, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency
Problem, 2004 Wisconsin Law Review 679; Roger C. Bern, “Terms Later” Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad
Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 Journal of Law and Policy 641
(2004); Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-Commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46
Wayne Law Review 1806 (2000); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts and

This problem is not entirely new. The earlier manifestation involved lengthy standard
form contracts that consumers signed when they purchased automobiles, appliances, and other
complex products. Consumers were given the opportunity to read the terms before they signed
the contracts but clearly many did not. They could not make their way through the legalese, the
complex sentences, the fine print, the sheer length of the document. Under the common law duty
to read they were nonetheless bound, but courts gradually relaxed the rule, holding that buyers
could be bound to especially unfavorable terms only if they were conspicuous (and not
unconscionable) What is different about the new group of cases is that the terms are not even
inconspicuous—they are invisible.
It would seem to follow that these contracts are invalid. And that is what the district court
held in the case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg.3 ProCD created a database consisting of names,
telephone numbers, and other information, from more than 3,000 telephone directories. It sold
two versions of this database: a cheaper version to the public, and a more expensive version to
businesses. The first contract limited use of the database to non-commercial purposes; the
contract with businesses had no such limitation. ProCD stated on the outside of the box that the
database is subject to restrictions in a license in the box but did not state what those restrictions
were. Zeidenberg bought the consumer version of the product and sought to resell ProCD’s
database to customers over the Internet. ProCD brought a lawsuit based on breach of contract.
The district court refused to enforce the license restriction, holding that the “offer,” which
included only the visible terms on the outside of the box, did not include the restriction to noncommercial uses.4 Zeidenberg “accepted” this offer by handing money over to the store. Because
he could not see and learn of the restriction at the time that he accepted, he could not be bound
by it.
The court’s decision was vulnerable to two objections, one logical and one practical. In
his opinion reversing the decision, Judge Easterbrook pressed both of these points.5 The logical
objection is that the offer did include the terms in the box by reference. If Zeidenberg did not like
the idea that he could be bound to terms that he has not seen, he was free to refuse to buy the
product.
In Wisconsin, as elsewhere, a contract includes only the terms on which the
parties have agreed. One cannot agree to hidden terms, the [district] judge
concluded. So far, so good—but one of the terms to which Zeidenberg agreed by
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purchasing the software is that the transaction was subject to a license.
Zeidenberg’s position therefore must be that the printed terms on the outside of a
box are the parties’ contract—except for printed terms that refer to or incorporate
other terms. But why would Wisconsin fetter the parties’ choice in this way?6
If contracts rest on consent, then parties should be able to consent to be bound by hidden terms.
The practical objection is that all the terms of a contract can rarely be put on the outside
of a box. Contracts are long and detailed by necessity. To sell goods, manufacturers need to be
able to put just the crucial terms on the box (such as the price) along with useful information, and
to omit information of little use to consumers, including information that was obvious. These
exigencies prevail in other settings as well. Here is Judge Easterbrook in the later case of Hill v.
Gateway, which involved the sale of a computer by phone:
Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation,
insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical considerations support allowing
vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their products. Cashiers cannot be
expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff
at the other end of the phone for direct-sales operations such as Gateway’s had to
read the four-page statement of terms before taking the buyer’s credit card
number, the droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential
buyers. Others would hang up in a rage over the waste of their time. And oral
recitation would not avoid customers’ assertions (whether true or feigned) that the
clerk did not read term X to them, or that they did not remember or understand it.
Writing provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions. Customers as
a group are better off when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as
telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple approve-or-return device.
Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or unread.7
When customers buy goods and services over the phone, they shouldn’t be required to listen to a
twenty-minute recitation of the contract terms. If they were forced to do so, they would not buy
goods in this way in the first place.
These two powerful objections imply that the district court erred by refusing to enforce
what I will call the “Incorporation Clause,” the clause that points to hidden terms inside the box.
But Judge Easterbrook does not, in fact, hold that the district court erred by failing to enforce the
Incorporation Clause. Instead, Judge Easterbrook holds that the district court erred by concluding
that acceptance took place at the time of purchase. In fact, according to Judge Easterbrook,
acceptance did not take place until Zeidenberg used the software. The reason is that the “offer”
was not “you may have the product if you pay now,” but “you may have the product if you pay
now and use it later.”
6
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This zigzag ought to puzzle the many commentators who attribute Judge Easterbrook’s
holding to free market zealotry, a notion that implies that a rational buyer should be held to
hidden terms that he consented to because he can rationally determine the odds that those terms
favor or hurt him. If that were Judge Easterbrook’s view, then he would have simply held that
Incorporation Clauses that point to hidden terms are enforceable, and he would not have needed
to construe the offer in what seems at first to be a strange fashion.
Why didn’t Judge Easterbrook take this simpler route? Consider the following clue:
Ours is not a case in which a consumer opens a package to find an insert saying
“you owe us an extra $10,000” and the seller files suit to collect. Any buyer
finding such a demand can prevent formation of the contract by returning the
package, as can any consumer who concludes that the terms of the license make
the software worth less than the purchase price.8
The free market zealot would not object to such a clause (which I will call a Surprise Clause). If
the buyer consents to the surprise, then he cannot claim that he was wronged if he does not like
it. Yet Judge Easterbrook balks at this conclusion, or appears to. Although he does not say that
he would not enforce such a term, he averts to offer-acceptance analysis rather than merely
saying that such a term is enforceable.
The issue came up in Hill v. Gateway as well. In that case, the buyers ordered a computer
over a telephone and later learned of an arbitration clause that they regarded as unfair. (They
could have, but did not, read the clause at the time that the computer arrived.) Under the clause, a
buyer would have to travel to Chicago for the arbitration and pay a fee of $4,000, only half of
which they could recover if they prevailed. In many if not all cases, it would be cheaper for the
buyer to purchase a new computer.9 The clause is not the same as “you owe us $10,000” but
comes close to denying the buyer any effective remedy in case of breach by Gateway. Although
the buyers in Hill had the right to return the computer within 30 days, they chose to keep it and
then sue. In the course of rejecting their argument under the ProCD precedent, Judge
Easterbrook noted:
Perhaps the Hills would have had a better argument if they were first alerted to
the bundling of hardware and legal-ware after opening the box and wanted to
return the computer in order to avoid disagreeable terms, but were dissuaded by
the expense of shipping. What the remedy would be in such a case—could it
exceed shipping charges?—is an interesting question, but one that need not detain
us because the Hills knew before they ordered the computer that the carton would
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include some important terms, and they did not seek to discover those in
advance.10
Again, Judge Easterbrook seems to insist that the buyer would not be bound by an adverse
Surprise Clause. He can simply return the product and, if it is expensive, he may even have a
remedy. And what if the seller says explicitly that the buyer has no right to return the product if
he dislikes the terms? On this crucial question, Easterbrook is silent.
The question takes on salience in light of another aspect of the Hill decision. Recall that
in ProCD, the seller had put the Incorporation Clause on the outside of the box. The observant
buyer therefore knows that a surprise might come when he opens the box, and can refrain from
taking this risk by refusing to buy. In Hill, Judge Easterbrook suggests that an Incorporation
Clause is not even necessary. In that case, there was no Incorporation Clause: there was just a
telephone conversation and no evidence that the operator warned the buyers of potentially
adverse terms. So unlike Zeidenberg, the Hills did not even learn that they were taking a risk.
Too bad, says Easterbrook:
Gateway’s ads state that their products come with limited warranties and lifetime
support. How limited was the warranty-30 days, with service contingent on
shipping the computer back, or five years, with free onsite service? What sort of
support was offered? Shoppers have three principal ways to discover these things.
First, they can ask the vendor to send a copy before deciding whether to buy. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act requires firms to distribute their warranty terms on
request, 15 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1)(A); the Hills do not contend that Gateway would
have refused to enclose the remaining terms too. Concealment would be bad for
business, scaring some customers away and leading to excess returns from others.
Second, shoppers can consult public sources (computer magazines, the Web sites
of vendors) that may contain this information. Third, they may inspect the
documents after the product's delivery. Like Zeidenberg, the Hills took the third
option. By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway's
offer, including the arbitration clause.11
It’s as though the box in ProCD did not even have an Incorporation Clause, and nonetheless
Zeidenberg was bound by the restrictions inside—on the theory that he could have, and should
have, telephoned the company prior to the purchase and demanded that it read the contract to
him.
On the one hand, Judge Easterbrook betrays some skepticism about market rationality by
balking at enforcing surprise clauses where the buyer has no right to return the product if he
dislikes them. On the other hand, Judge Easterbrook seems to show extreme faith in market
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rationality by suggesting that buyers do not need notice of incorporated terms because they can
ask about them prior to entering a contract.
The tension between these positions lessens, however, when one understands what
exactly Judge Easterbrook’s doctrinal approach does. Because the buyer has the leisure to read
the terms after he obtains the product, it doesn’t matter whether he knows of those terms before
the product is delivered, or has been given a hint that they might exist. Even if he knows nothing
at all about the terms, he is free to return the product for a full refund. So far from assuming
hyperrationality on the part of the buyer, Judge Easterbrook makes a pretty conventional
assumption that the buyer needs to see the terms before he gives his consent. At the same time,
he gives due recognition to the cognitive constraints on precontractual communication. The
burden of communicating the terms prior to purchase is relieved because the buyer has the
leisure to read the terms after purchase. So the two opposing ideas—that the buyer needs to
know the terms before he can be contractually bound, and the seller does not have the time or
space to communicate the terms before the purchase—are reconciled. The box can have a
modernist aesthetic of empty planes and clean lines; the buyer can learn as much as he wants at
home before committing himself to the purchase. Freedom of contract is vindicated and unwary
buyers are protected. Judge Easterbrook’s doctrinal solution is ingenious.
But it is not flawless. To see why, consider the chain of reasoning that leads to it. Citing
the chestnut that the “offeror is master of the offer,” Judge Easterbrook argues that ProCD
stipulated that the offeree accepts the contract “by using the software after having an opportunity
to read the license at leisure.”12 In fact, ProCD was not so clear, and its offer could have been
construed differently.13 But whether ProCD made the offer Judge Easterbrook attributes to it, it
certainly did not have to. If the offeror is master of the offer, he can certainly stipulate that the
buyer has no right to return the product after taking it home. Now we are back to where we
started. Whatever it did, ProCD could have included a Surprise Clause while denying the buyer a
right to return the product if the term displeases him. If buyers are sufficiently rational, they can
read the Incorporation Clause and take the gamble. Indeed, if we are to believe Judge
Easterbrook’s dicta in Hill, an Incorporation Clause is not necessary at all. All that is necessary is
a price and a no-return clause; the rational buyer will infer the rest. If buyers are not sufficiently
rational, then what can protect them from adverse Surprise Clauses?
So the opinion does not, after all, resolve the tension between market rationality and
unfair surprise. If Judge Easterbrook believes that a no-return offer with a Surprise Clause should
be valid, then he shouldn’t be uneasy about Surprise Clauses. Nor should he suggest in Hill that
if the buyers have to pay to return the product, they ought to have a remedy. But if he doesn’t
believe that a no-return offer with a Surprise Clause should be valid, then he can’t truly think that
12
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the offeror is master of the offer. This infringement on freedom of contract would be at odds with
Judge Easterbrook’s confidence in market forces elsewhere in these opinions and in other
settings as well.14
What accounts for this tension? The best explanation is that Judge Easterbrook is
foremost a common law judge—not an ideologue or theorist—who in these two cases smells a
rat (or several rats)—the plaintiffs. Zeidenberg was trying to expropriate ProCD’s investment;
the Hills were lazy and should have read the terms. Judge Easterbrook believes that for certain
types of transactions—involving complex products and terms that consumers are not willing to
read before purchasing the products—a “terms later” offer makes the most sense. This gives the
consumer the leisure to read the terms, and the consumer who forgoes this opportunity has no
right to complain. In so holding, Judge Easterbrook shows a great deal more imagination than the
district judge, who can conceive of only two alternatives—the consumer knows nothing at the
time of sale or he knows everything. Where the seller is not clear about the terms of the offer, the
court will infer that it takes this form, which seems to be mutually beneficial. But this rule seems
to be more than a presumption that can be overcome by an explicit offer that gives the buyer no
right to return. The court is aware that this approach can be abused, that a seller can insert a
Surprise Clause and provide for no return. The outcome in such a case is left open—no need to
decide it here—but in both ProCD and Hill, Judge Easterbrook hints unmistakably, if
unenthusiastically, that this type of abuse will not be tolerated—that the surprised consumer will
have a remedy.
We might usefully think of this approach as updating the old idea with which we began—
that adverse terms in complex form contracts can be enforced only if they are sufficiently
conspicuous. Judge Easterbrook, in effect, takes this idea and extends it temporally. “Sufficiently
conspicuous” can mean not only “on a piece of paper that I read before I sign at store” but also
“on a piece of paper that I read before I use the product at home.” This arrangement seems so
reasonable to Judge Easterbrook that he is willing to construe ambiguous offers as having this
form. An explicit offer that departs too far from this paradigm—that reveals harsh terms only
after the opportunity to return has vanished—will, or might, run into trouble.
Can such an approach be defended? No case, in Wisconsin or elsewhere, had endorsed
the approach taken by Judge Easterbrook.15 But courts have always construed offers to advance
policy goals, and computer software contracts and over-the-phone contracts provide a novel
setting not adequately addressed in earlier cases or by the UCC drafters. Law professors usually
criticize judges who allow form to triumph over substance. Easterbrook is the latest in a long line
of celebrated judges who shape the common law to the needs of commercial actors.
14
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But is Judge Easterbrook’s rule, in fact, the best for this situation? The nub of the
problem is that sellers and buyers need a way for sellers to convey sufficient information about a
product prior to the contract, without boring buyers or driving them to distraction. As is always
the case with contract, the failure to solve this problem hurts sellers and buyers. If the seller
gives too much information, she will drive away buyers. If the sellers gives too little information,
she will mislead buyers.
Given this problem, what is the optimal legal rule? Let’s consider three possibilities.
First, the district court’s rule, which is apparently that it will not enforce Incorporation Clauses.16
Let us call this rule the non-enforcement rule. Second, the opposite rule would be to enforce all
Incorporation Clauses; we will call this rule the enforcement rule. Third, we will call the return
rule the doctrine that an incorporation rule is enforceable only if the buyer has the right to return
the product after reading the terms.
To examine these rules more formally, imagine that the Seller sells a product whose use
can be either “unrestricted” or “restricted” (to noncommercial uses). The product costs some
amount to produce, but the unrestricted version imposes a further cost on the Seller by reducing
her protection from uses that might reduce demand (the cost cH > cL, the cost of the restricted
version).17 There are two types of buyers, high types and low types. High types value the
unrestricted version (and will pay a lot for it) (vH); low types will not pay more for the
unrestricted version than for the restricted version and are not willing to pay much for either (vL).
If Seller has market power, and can charge different prices for each version, she will charge pH
for the unrestricted version and pL for the restricted version, such that pH = vH > cH, and pL = vL >
cL. Let us further assume that vL < cH: low types value the unrestricted version less than its cost.
To segregate the market in this way, Seller must be able to force the low-type buyers to
accept the restrictions, which will appear in the contract. Suppose, however, that the cost of
communicating the restriction, t, is very high, higher than the benefit from segregating the
market. If so, Seller can sell only the unrestricted version. In our example, Seller would choose a
price of vH and deprive the low types of the product. In a more general setting, where Seller faces
a distribution of types, she will set a price that is too high for those at the bottom tail so that she
gets a larger surplus from those higher up on the distribution.
This outcome is a welfare loss for Seller and (as long as the price is at least a little bit
below valuations) low-type buyers—relative to the outcome if communication costs were zero.
The question now is whether the legal rule can improve the outcome.
16
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Let us suppose that the Seller cannot write the restrictions on the outside of the box at
low cost: any such effort would merely confuse buyers or deter them from purchasing the
product. However, an incorporation provision, together with the restrictions contained in the
contract in the box, would be relatively cheap.
It is clear that the non-enforcement rule does not improve outcomes. It simply deprives
Seller of the ability to reduce communication costs to a level that would permit segregation of
the market. This was the basis of Judge Easterbrook’s ruling.
However, it turns out that the enforcement rule also does not improve outcomes—at least,
not in a simple model where all that matters is contract enforcement (and not, as we will see,
reputation or branding). To see why, imagine how a buyer might think about a box which says
“restrictions inside” and “no return.” The buyer does not know what those restrictions are: they
could include a “Surprise! You pay $10,000” clause, or any other clause (such as an arbitration
clause with a high fee) that the buyer does not like. It is possible that a buyer might attach a
probability of, say, q, that such a clause would be in the box. Sellers would have to discount the
price by q times the loss the buyer imagines. But—and here is the problem—rational sellers
would include further restrictions so as to reduce their costs. Buyers, anticipating this, would
assume that the contract is maximally bad, and would demand an even lower price. The market
“unravels.” This is the familiar lemons problem.18
So, ironically, an Incorporation Clause without a return right should be as likely to exist
in the market as clauses requiring the buyer to devour his own children. Why, then, do they
exist? Initially, it is not clear that they do exist in the pure form—that is, an Incorporation Clause
along with a no-return clause. Unraveling will not occur if the buyer has the right to reject after
inspecting the contract and before use. Perhaps that is exactly what happens, which would
explain why Judge Easterbrook so confidently construes ProCD’s offer in the way that he does.
A rational offeror would never propose an Incorporation Clause along with a no-return clause
because a rational buyer would never accept such an offer.
A further point is that, if such cases exist, buyers probably rely on the reputation of the
seller. They assume that terms will be reasonable because any seller who inserted Surprise
Clauses in boxes would quickly lose their business. Indeed, buyers depend on the seller’s
reputation for much more important features of the product than arbitration terms and warranties.
Contracts almost never say that if you don’t like the software, you can return it, yet buyers
usually have no idea how well the software will perform, and buy in the first place only because

18

George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488
(1970).

9

of word-of-mouth and the reputation of the seller. So it wouldn’t be surprising if buyers
depended on the seller’s reputation for fair contractual terms as well as for high-quality goods.
If Incorporation Clauses interact with branding dynamics in this way, courts should
enforce them, return clause or no return clause. But there is reason to think the market does not
always work this well. Some consumers buy from some sellers who do not have good
reputations; and some sellers with good reputations might insert terms that some buyers do not
want. The return rule makes allowances for these limits on human cognition, insisting that people
be given the opportunity to read before they are bound to a contract.
To be sure, the return rule has costs of its own. If the buyer can take the product home
and inspect it and later return it, he may be able to use it in a way that reduces its value or
otherwise harms the seller. Further, buyers may not read the contract even if they have leisure to
do so. However, this is an old problem, not one special to this case, and courts have agreed that
as long as a contract is reasonably clear and potentially adverse or surprising terms are
conspicuous, buyers have no remedy if they fail to read it.19 It would be odd if Judge Easterbrook
decided to revisit this issue in a “terms later” case, where buyers are under less pressure to sign
the contract because a salesman is not breathing down their neck.20
One might argue that a more straightforward approach to the problem of cognitive
overload is for courts to apply the enforcement rule along with a generous doctrine of
unconscionability that allowed them to strike out any terms that they deem unreasonable. Such
an approach assumes that courts can figure out whether a term is commercially reasonable or
not—which seems pretty doubtful, especially given courts’ traditional reluctance to analyze the
contract terms and the market in a sophisticated way. But the decisive objection is that it
prevents market segregation—with some consumers reading contracts and returning goods
because of adverse terms, and other consumers either reading the contracts and keeping the
goods or not reading the contracts and keeping the goods. There are good business reasons for
packaging software with different licensing agreements that offer different levels of restriction.
Wielding the cudgel of the unconscionability doctrine, courts would need to make all-or-nothing
judgments about whether a particular restriction is commercially reasonable or not. Unless courts
are prepared to ascertain whether some buyers care about arbitration clauses and other buyers are
not—and they have never shown such an inclination—the unconscionability doctrine would
introduce unwanted rigidity to the market.21

19
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There are other risks. Richard Epstein argues that the problem with the return rule is that
it entails that no contractual provisions govern the relationship between the buyer and seller
during the important period after the buyer leaves the store and before he either uses or returns
the product. What happens if the product is destroyed during that interval? How could the
contract stipulate that the buyer has an obligation to return the unwanted product to the original
retail store if, by assumption, no contract exists?22 However, these problems are less serious than
Epstein suggests. If the offeror is master of the offer, he can stipulate that rejection occurs only if
the product is returned (undamaged) to the original store. Indeed, he can stipulate, as a part of the
offer, all the terms that will govern the treatment of the goods before they are either kept or
returned. And if he does not, the law can always supply default terms.
ProCD precipitated a typhoon of academic hostility. It is probably the most criticized
case in the modern history of American contract law. Law professors scrambled to condemn
Judge Easterbrook, with some accusing him of intellectual dishonesty and ideological zealotry.23
My view is different. The portion of Judge Easterbrook’s opinion concerning contract doctrine is
a creative and intelligent effort to address the problem of cognitive overload in bargaining. From
a pedagogical perspective, the opinion belongs to an important genre, the contract opinion that
drags the law forward so that it can address a new type of behavior. Consider a case like Wood v.
Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, where Judge Cardozo, in essence, discarded the consideration doctrine
because it blocked commercially reasonable contracts that happened to impose precise
obligations on only one of the two parties.24 This was an intelligent and overdue move taken
under cover of doctrinal manipulation. Easterbrook is Cardozo’s heir. In a similar way, Judge
Easterbrook reformulates offer/acceptance doctrine so as to permit enforcement of “terms later”
contracts, an important new business tool.
Judge Easterbrook resisted the radical move that might have been suggested by free
market thinking—that even an Incorporation Clause with no right of return can be enforced—
because (one speculates) such a move would have outstripped the law too far to be acceptable to
the legal community, which has apparently accepted ProCD despite the objections of law
professors. It would also have been unnecessary. More than a decade later, as far as I know there
has not been a case involving a Surprise Clause and a no-return clause, suggesting that sellers
either do not use such terms or buyers, relying on branding to protect them, do not object to
them. Indeed, evidence suggests that the terms in “terms later” contracts and other types of
contracts are the same, indicating that adverse surprise terms are not inserted in “terms later”
contracts.25 Time, then, has vindicated ProCD, which will be remembered as a masterpiece of
realist judging, one of the great opinions in the entire canon of contract law cases.
22
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